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ABSTRACT 
Copyright law aims to promote the dual goals of 
incentivizing production of literary and artistic works, and 
promoting public access and free speech. To achieve these goals, 
Congress has implemented a policy that acknowledges the rights 
of both the copyright holder and the public, which vest with the 
fixation of the work. However, as Congressional action has 
strengthened copyright protection, the rights of the public have 
been narrowed. Orphan works – works to which the copyright 
owner cannot be located or identified – present a unique 
problem, in that achieving free access and use of the works is 
often impossible. This note argues that the public has a 
recognizable right in both gaining access to and using orphan 
works – a right which emanates from, but is tangential to, the 
First Amendment right to free speech.  
INTRODUCTION 
 The framework of the United States’ current copyright regime is 
founded largely on a multitude of balancing tests. At its most 
fundamental level, copyright protects the expression of an idea – not the 
idea itself – in order to strike a balance between granting the public free 
access to creative expression and protecting the interests of that 
expression’s creator.1 Yet implicit within this simple baseline are myriad 
other intellectual seesaws that Congress and courts have ridden to arrive 
at this idea/expression dichotomy.2  
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1 See Franklin Mint Corp. v. Nat’l Wildlife Exch., Inc., 575 F.2d 62, 64 (3d Cir. 
1978) (“[T]o reconcile the societal interests inherent in the copyright law, 
copyright protection has been extended only to the particular expression of an 
idea and not the idea itself.”). 
2  See Glenn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access 
Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 485 (1996) (“[D]efining copyright’s proper 
scope has become a matter of balancing the benefits of broader protection, in the 
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 On one end of the seesaw, an economic incentive model speaks 
strongly for more extensive protection of copyright holders. The 
exclusive rights inherent within copyright protection create a market, 
which allows authors to obtain financial reward for their work.3 This 
economic model dictates that the more the copyright holder is afforded 
the exclusive rights to his work, the more he will be motivated to 
produce copyrightable works.4 Put simply, “[t]he greater the protection, 
the greater the reward; the greater the reward, the greater the incentive to 
create new works; and the greater the incentive to create new works, the 
greater the number of new works created.”5   
 On the other end of the seesaw, critical free speech interests keep 
the copyright regime from exacting a stronger hold over authors’ works. 
The First Amendment seeks to “maximize the dissemination of 
information,” while copyright law seeks to “restrict the ability of people 
to disseminate speech.” 6  Thus, courts have interpreted the First 
Amendment as an inherent limitation on the copyright regime, and a 
possible check on Congress’s power to expand it.7 Other principles of the 
creative process serve to limit copyright’s hold as well. For example, the 
truism that all works of authorship build in some part on previous 
creations necessitates the allowance of some borrowing from other works 
to further creative expression.8 
                                                                                                                         
form of increased incentive to produce such works, against its costs, in the form 
of lost access to such works.”); see also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. 
Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The limited scope of the copyright holder’s 
statutory monopoly . . . reflects a balance of competing aims upon the public 
interest[.]”). 
3 Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Jiayang Sun, & Yiying Fan, Does Copyright Promote 
Creativity?: An Empirical Study of Copyright’s Bounty, 62 VAND. L. REV 1669, 
1671 (2009). 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6  Erwin Chemerinksy, Balancing Copyright Protections and Freedom of 
Speech: Why the Copyright Extension Act is Unconstitutional, 36 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 83, 83 (2002).  
7 See id. at 87; see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (finding 
that the “idea/expression dichotomy strike[s] a definitional balance between the 
First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of 
facts while still protecting an author’s expression.”) (quoting Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985)). 
8 See Lunney, supra note 3, at 509 (“Because an author will inevitably reuse 
some elements that have appeared previously in earlier copyrighted works, 
allowing a trier of fact to find infringement based upon the reappearance of such 
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 Engaging in this delicate balancing act, Congress and the courts 
fashioned the copyright regime, all the while asserting a decidedly pro-
public interest view of copyright law.9 The Supreme Court has explicitly 
declared that the purpose of copyright law, as intended by the framers of 
the Constitution, is not primarily to protect the author’s rights, but to 
“stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.”10  Thus, the 
copyright provisions reached by Congress, and the monopolistic 
privileges they confer, must ultimately serve to further this public good.11 
 In furtherance of this purpose, Congress has created an 
inherently limited copyright doctrine.12 Only those uses expressly laid 
out as “exclusive” are born with an original work and vest in the author 
at the moment of fixation for the duration of copyright.13 At the same 
moment, numerous rights vest in the public – rights to ideas, quotes, fair 
uses, nominative uses, parodies, and many more.14 The public retains not 
merely those rights reserved explicitly by statute, but also those created 
by the nature of copyright itself. The idea/expression dichotomy ensures 
that the idea embedded within the work is effectively gifted to the world 
at the time of fixation – once it is revealed, it is impossible to protect 
again.15 Thus, at the time of publication, the public has actually gained 
                                                                                                                         
elements would unduly limit the ability of later authors to exercise their own 
creativity and would threaten the creation of future works.”). 
9 See Twentieth Century Music Corp v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) 
(“Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must 
ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, 
music, and the other arts.”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 7 (1909) (“In 
enacting a copyright law Congress must consider . . . two questions: First, how 
much will the legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit the public; and 
second, how much will the monopoly granted be detrimental to the public?”).  
10 Twentieth Century Music Corp., 422 U.S. at 156; see Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. 
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (“[T]he primary objective 
of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors but to promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts[.]”). 
11 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).  
12 See id. (“[This] limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose 
may be achieved.”). 
13 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2010) (The six exclusive rights, in short form, are (1) to 
reproduce the work; (2) to prepare derivative works based on the work; (3) to 
distribute copies of the work to the public; (4) to perform the work publicly; (5) 
to display the work publicly; (6) to perform sound recordings publicly by means 
of a digital transmission). 
14 17 U.S.C. §§ 107–22.  
15 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (“[E]very idea, theory, and 
fact in a copyrighted work becomes instantly available for public exploitation at 
the moment of publication.”); see also Int’l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 
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something quite tangible: the right to use and build upon a new idea, and 
to take certain expression and use it in any number of ways. 
 The ways in which the public may make use of the work, taken 
together, comprise one definition of that elusive term, the “public 
domain.”16 Liberally defining the public domain as such, and not merely 
as those works that have been freed from copyright restraints, 
acknowledges the creation of a powerful bundle of rights for the public.17 
Indeed, this is exactly what Congress wanted to emphasize in the 
creation of the statute, and what courts have repeatedly stressed. 
Copyright provides only limited rights to the holder himself. Outside of 
those limited rights, the rights to the use of the information automatically 
vest in the public.18 This note argues that this explicit division of rights is 
undermined by provisions Congress has repeatedly enacted that sequester 
orphan works – and the information held within – out of the public’s 
reach.  
I. ORPHAN WORKS 
A. The Problem in General 
 Congress’s 2008 Report on Orphan Works defines the orphan 
works problem as a situation in which “the owner of a copyright cannot 
be identified and located by someone who wishes to make use of the 
work in a manner that requires permission of the copyright owner.”19 
Because of copyright’s division of rights between the copyright holder 
and the public, any person who wants to copy or borrow from a work 
must first seek permission from the copyright holder. However, for a 
                                                                                                                         
U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (“The general rule of law is, that the noblest of human 
productions – knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas – become, 
after voluntary communication to others, free as the air to common use.”) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
16 See Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment 
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354, 362 
(1999) (“[T]he public domain is the range of uses of information that any person 
is privileged to make absent individualized facts that make a particular use by a 
particular person unprivileged.”).  
17 See id. at 363 (“[A]nyone is privileged to use information in ways that are in 
the public domain, and absent individualized reasons, government will not 
prevent those uses.”). 
18  See id. at 358 (“[T]he government has prohibited certain uses or 
communications of information to all people but one, the owner. The public 
domain, conversely, is the range of uses privileged to all.”). 
19 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS 1 (2006). 
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number of reasons, ownership information can be difficult to find.20 A 
work might be missing an author’s identification, a work’s author might 
be deceased, with heirs unknown, or a work’s publisher might have gone 
out of business with assigned rights unknown.21 Even if the author can be 
identified, often there is no corresponding contact information, or, if 
contacted, the author may not respond.22 Those works whose copyright 
information cannot be located are called “orphan works.” 
 Given the size of the body of copyrighted works, it follows 
logically that there exist some works that have near-untraceable origins. 
Despite this certainty, the inability to locate a copyright holder does not 
protect users from the “strict liability hammer of copyright law.”23 As 
such, a common situation often arises where a creator seeks to 
incorporate an older work into a new work, and is willing to seek 
permission, but is not able to identify or locate the copyright owner in 
order to do so.24 In such circumstances, though the creator’s use may not 
infringe copyright, under the current system the copyright in the work is 
still valid and enforceable, and the risk of an infringement claim cannot 
be completely eliminated.25 With the high costs of litigation, and the 
inability of most creators, scholars, and small publishers to bear those 
costs, often “orphan works often are not used – even where there is no 
one who would object to the use.”26 Because of this, “[w]hatever value 
those works originally had as foundational materials for other works is 
then lost, as future use is chilled by the possibility of litigious ‘parents’ 
returning to protect their (previously valueless) orphan work.”27  
                                                      
20 Olive Huang, U.S. Copyright Office Orphan Works Inquiry: Finding Homes 
for the Orphans, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 265, 265 (2006). 
21 Comment of the Carnegie Mellon Univ. Libraries, In re Orphan Works, No. 
537 (Mar. 22, 2005) at 2, available at http:www.copyright.gov/orphan/comm 
ents/OW0537-CarnegieMellon.pdf. 
22 Id. at 3. 
23 The “Orphan Works” Problem and Proposed Legislation: Hearings Before 
the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. 
Committee of the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 131, at 17 (2008) (statement of 
Marybeth Peters, The Register of Copyrights), available at http://www.copyr 
ight.gov/docs/regstat031308.html. 
24Id. at 16. For a few telling examples of abandoned projects, see Pamela 
Brannon, Reforming Copyright to Foster Innovation: Providing Access to 
Orphaned Works, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 145, 146–47 (2006). 
25 Notice of Inquiry, 70 Fed. Reg. 3739 (Jan. 26, 2005).  
26 Id. 
27 Keith Porcaro, Student Note, Private Ordering and Orphan Works: Our Least 
Worst Hope? 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 015 at ¶6. 
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B. Intensification of the Orphan Works Problem 
Though orphan works have long been an unfortunate byproduct 
of the United States’ copyright framework, Congress’s recent actions 
have created both a heightened awareness of the problem and an 
escalation of its scale.28 First, in 1989, Congress removed the condition 
that published works must contain a copyright notice.29 Since works now 
have no registration requirement, no repository exists to determine and 
locate authors of works. 1992 provided perhaps the most significant 
contributor to the explosion of the orphan works problem, with the 
removal of the last vestiges of the renewal requirement.30 This move 
shifted copyright from an “opt-in” system, which required content 
creators to actively maintain copyright, to an “opt-out” system.31 Thus, 
works that might have entered the public domain due to a low 
commercial value – providing little incentive to renew – now remain 
covered by copyright.32 Two years later, under the Berne Convention, 
many foreign copyrights were extracted from the public domain and 
brought back under copyright protection.33 These foreign works present 
the unique challenge of tracking down copyright owners who are both in 
another country and under the assumption that their work is not under 
copyright protection. Against this backdrop of decreased formalities has 
been a steady increase in the length of the copyright term itself, with the 
most recent, the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 
extending the term to 70 years after the author’s death.34 The net result of 
these amendments and this “virtually perpetual” term35 is that more and 
more copyright owners go missing.  
 
 At the same time, the need to acquire permission for use of a 
work has expanded, exacerbating the orphan works problem.36  The 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act has placed additional restrictions on 
fair use, particularly for digital content.37 Copyright extension imposes a 
                                                      
28 Huang, supra note 21, at 268 (“The orphan works problem is largely a by-
product of developments in U.S. copyright laws that have increased the strength 
and duration of protection for primary creators.”). 
29 U.S. Copyright Office, Circular 3 Copyright Notice (2011). 
30 U.S. Copyright Office, Circular 15 Extension of Copyright Terms (2010). 
31 Kahle v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 697, 699 (9th Cir. 2007). 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 242–43 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
35 Id. at 243. 
36 CHRISTINE L. BORGMAN, SCHOLARSHIP IN THE DIGITAL AGE: INFORMATION, 
INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE INTERNET 108 (MIT Press, 2007). 
37 Id. 
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permissions requirement – “not only upon potential users of ‘classic’ 
works that still retain commercial value, but also upon potential users of 
any other work still in copyright.”38  Thus, a culture of permissions has 
arisen that can inhibit or prevent the use of old works, and is only 
increasing in scale.39 As one scholar puts it, “these idiosyncrasies in 
American copyright law conspire to create orphan works.”40 
Further, and perhaps most important, the wealth of knowledge 
locked away within orphan works is literally disintegrating. A study done 
by Carnegie Mellon suggests that over half of the books published in the 
United States since 1923 are now out of print.41 Older books printed on 
non-acid-free paper will eventually dissolve, and many out of print books 
are already in advanced states of decay – a process that non-digital 
preservation efforts cannot remedy.42 Similarly, orphan films constitute 
the majority of the Library of Congress’s impressive collection.43 In 
1994, the Librarian of Congress estimated that 80% of films from the 
1920’s, and 90% of the films from the 1910’s had already decayed 
beyond repair. 44  These orphan films cannot be widely viewed or 
distributed due to uncertainty about copyright status. By the same token, 
digitization efforts are stymied, locking these works into a perpetual state 
of decay remedied only by primitive restoration techniques. 45   As 
transaction costs and the difficulty of locating copyright owners inhibit 
the ability of creators to build off of previous works, the increasingly 
poor condition of these works will further deter their use.46  
                                                      
38 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 249 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
39 See id. at 250, 252. 
40 Brannon, supra note 25, at 158. 
41 Comment of the Carnegie Mellon Univ. Libraries, supra note 22, at 3; see 
also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable 
Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 474 (2003) (“[O]f 10,027 books published in 
the United States in 1930, only 174, or 1.7 percent, were still in print in 2001.”). 
42 Comment of the Carnegie Mellon Univ. Libraries, supra note 22, at 6. 
43 Duke University School of Law Center for the Study of the Public Domain, 
Access to Orphan Films: Submission to the Copyright Office (2005), 
http://www.law.duke.edu/cspd/pdf/cspdorphanfilm.pdf. 
44 REDEFINING FILM PRESERVATION: A NATIONAL PLAN; RECOMMENDATIONS OF 
THE LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS IN CONSULTATION WITH THE NATIONAL FILM 
PRESERVATION BOARD 23 (Annette Melville & Scott Simmon eds., 1994). 
45  See Pamela Samuelson, Toward a “New Deal” for Copyright in the 
Information Age, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1488, 1494 (2002) (explaining that since 
creating a digital work “requires making a copy in the transmission process,” 
digitization requires consent of the copyright holder). 
46 Porcaro, supra note 28, at 16. 
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C. Traditional Arguments Urging for Orphan Works Reform  
A number of arguments have been made condemning the rigid 
copyright policy responsible for keeping orphan works off limits. These 
arguments generally take one of two forms. First, an economic argument 
holds that orphan works undermine copyright’s incentive to create, as 
additional transaction costs are placed on subsequent creators wishing to 
use material from existing works.47 Second, critics point out that orphan 
works do not “promote the progress” 48  as prescribed by both the 
Constitution and the copyright statute.49 The risk of potential liability, 
distant but still harsh, impedes rather than encourages creative efforts. 
When the author cannot be found, subsequent creators are dissuaded 
from creating new works that incorporate those existing works, resulting 
in a net loss for the creative wealth of society. 
These arguments herald more permissive use of orphan works as 
a way to align existing law with the traditional tenets of copyright law. 
Those tenets promote the creation of a strong incentive structure for 
creators to produce works, and further the principle that borrowing is 
inherent and vital to the creative process. Stated another way, these 
arguments focus on the disutility of the orphan works sitting “lost in the 
bowels of a few great libraries”50 and not on the active right of the public 
to access them. 
But there is another fundamental argument that must be raised 
when addressing the orphan works problem. If orphan works’ copyright 
owners are given the same rights as any other works’ owners, then the 
public must be guaranteed the same rights to orphan works as they are to 
any copyrighted work. Yet in practice, because copyright law encloses 
orphan works to the point of inaccessibility, the public is in fact deprived 
of the rights granted to them. 
II. PUBLIC RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 
Courts have been decisive in their role as protectorates of 
creative dissemination, repeatedly demonstrating their interest in 
preserving the public’s right to access and make use of the vast body of 
                                                      
47 See generally, Sami J. Valkonen & Lawrence J. White, An Economic Model 
for the Incentive/Access Paradigm of Copyright Propertization: An Argument in 
Support of the Orphan Works Act, 29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 359 (2007). 
48 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
49 See generally, Brannon, supra note 25.  
50 Miguel Helft, Google’s Plan for Out-of-Print Books is Challenged, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 3, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/0 
4/04/technology/internet/04books.html?_r=1. 
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creative works available. The Eleventh Circuit explained that through 
copyright’s structure, “the public is protected in two ways: the grant of a 
copyright encourages authors to create new works . . . and the limitation 
ensures that the works will eventually enter the public domain, which 
protects the public’s right of access and use.”51 However, nowhere in the 
copyright statute is the “public domain” defined.52  
A. Defining the Public Domain 
Defining the parameters of the public domain has proven to be a 
difficult task. One interpretation views the public domain, and the public 
rights that it embodies, as materially undeserving of the otherwise 
expansive rights granted to the copyright owner.53 Another view takes 
the position that the intellectual property regime grants the author only 
those “limited rights” delineated in the statute, leaving all other rights to 
the public untouched.54 In sum, the operative question remains whether 
the public domain is “simply whatever is left over after various tests of 
legal protection have been applied . . . the ‘negative’ of whatever may be 
protected” or in fact something positive, something “of the form instead 
of just the background.”55  
As Congress’s express mission in creating the copyright statute 
was to “promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts,” 56 it seems 
clear that the public benefit, if not the public domain per se, was at the 
forefront of the founders’ minds.  Still, to go a step further and take the 
position that the public domain is a positive form, there must be some 
public policy argument or legal principle compelling enough to give the 
public domain “a life of its own.”57 Filling this void, a solution emerges 
from a rarely articulated third viewpoint that diverges from the 
dichotomy of a “negative” versus “positive” form explained above. This 
view posits that the public’s right to access and use copyrighted works 
                                                      
51 Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1262 (11th Cir. 
2001). 
52 Elizabeth Townsend Gard, Copyright Law v. Trade Policy: Understanding the 
Golan Battle Within the Tenth Circuit, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 131, 131 (2011). 
53 See, e.g., Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright: Proposals and 
Prospects, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 831 (1966). 
54 See, e.g., Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990). 
55 Edward Samuels, The Public Domain in Copyright Law, 41 J. COPYRIGHT 
SOC’Y 137, 137 (1993). 
56 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
57 Samuels, supra note 56. 
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derives from elsewhere in the Constitution, such as the First Amendment 
right to free speech.58 
Recently, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments on Golan v. 
Holder, in which the plaintiffs – a group of orchestra conductors, 
educators, performers, film archivists and motion picture distributors – 
argued that the First Amendment should be used as a mechanism to hold 
provisions of the Berne Convention unconstitutional. These provisions 
restored a large number of U.S. copyrights for foreign works that never 
previously had U.S. protection.59 The plaintiffs claimed that they had 
depended for years on these previously public domain works and were 
cut off from those opportunities when Congress granted the works a new 
copyright.60 They argued that the provisions were unduly restrictive of 
free speech, and violated the First Amendment under an intermediate 
scrutiny analysis.61 
This will not be the first time that the Court has addressed 
copyright concerns under a First Amendment framework, and the free 
speech issues at work here are certainly compelling. 62  However, 
approaching the public domain through this lens may not solve the 
problem of orphan works. Technically, free speech relating to orphan 
works is just as “free” as it is with any copyrighted work – the same laws 
apply, and with them convey the same rights. This is a different situation 
than in Golan, where Congress’s affirmative legislative actions directly 
affected the channels of free expression. 
The problem remains, however, that uniformly applying the 
current structure of the law effectively locks away orphan works – and 
all uses thereof – in a box that current copyright policy does not have the 
tools to open. Access to the work itself, either because the work is no 
longer being distributed or has literally fallen apart, is one of the most 
difficult hurdles to overcome in any attempt to use an orphan work. 
Someone who merely wants to read a book, which might then inspire 
him to write his own story or conduct his own research, cannot do so 
                                                      
58 See Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (reviewing restoration 
provisions of the Uruguay Rounds Agreement under First Amendment analysis); 
Kahle v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 2007) (reviewing automatic renewal 
provision under First mendment analysis); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 
(2003) (recognizing that copyrights are not “categorically immune from 
challenges under the First Amendment”). It should be noted that none of these 
cases have held that the contested legislation violated a First Amendment right. 
59 Golan, 609 F.3d at 1081. 
60 Id. at 1082. 
61 Id. at 1083. 
62 See note 59, supra, and accompanying text.  
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because he physically cannot access the book.63 Use of a work for 
research purposes, a well-established fair use,64 is similarly hindered by 
the orphan works problem, with many researchers abandoning their 
projects as transaction costs increase.65 No scholar would argue that 
either of these uses constitute violations of copyright, yet they are de 
facto prohibited by the current structure of the law. 
If this were a traditional free speech issue, a constitutional 
problem would arise only if the second-comer’s speech were abridged – 
that is, if he is prevented from creating a new work. However, the 
structure of copyright law not only prohibits that second work from 
being created, but stops the flow of information from the orphan work to 
the potential author in the first place. As such, the potential author has 
essentially been stripped of crucial rights that copyright provides. He 
cannot access the information within, he cannot ruminate or extrapolate 
ideas from it, read it to his children – purely because he cannot access it. 
This creates a more tenuous free speech claim, one that implicates the 
connected rights of access to information and the right to listen. 
B. Access Rights 
The First Amendment right to free speech is meaningless 
without a way to exercise it.66 Though second-comers are technically not 
forbidden from making speech that utilizes orphan works, the ability to 
pursue such speech possibilities is so limited that the right itself is 
rendered insignificant. To remedy this injustice, this note proposes that a 
modified right of access be recognized in the public, deriving from the 
common law principles of a right to access information and a right to 
listen.  
The First Amendment right of access flows from the First 
Amendment’s guarantees of the freedoms of speech and press.67 Though 
                                                      
63 See, e.g., Comment of Tracy Baker, Assistant Head of Reference, Minn. 
Historical Soc’y, to Jule L. Sigall, Assoc. Register for Policy and Int’l Affairs, 
Copyright Office (Mar. 10, 2005), http://copyright.gov/orphan/com 
ments/OW0253-BakerT.pdf (explaining that her library owns many historical 
films with little or no credit information, which they are unable to make 
available to researchers). 
64 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2010). 
65 Brannon, supra note 25, at 149. 
66 See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (“[T]he protection 
of the Bill of Rights goes beyond the specific guarantees to protect from 
congressional abridgment those equally fundamental personal rights necessary 
to make the express guarantees fully meaningful.”) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
67 Meliah Thomas, The First Amendment Right of Access to Docket Sheets, 94 
CAL. L. REV. 1537, 1566 (2006). 
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the right is currently recognized only in limited circumstances, as a “right 
to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial 
records and documents,”68 the right is still developing, and the full scope 
of its application remains to be seen.69 The right of access was first 
established by the Supreme Court in Nixon v. Warner Communications,70 
and firmly upheld in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,71 in which 
the Court recognized the media’s right of access to criminal trials. In 
upholding the right in Richmond, the Court cited broad principles, 
including a “tradition of openness” and the need to promote accurate 
fact-finding.72 Further, the Court acknowledged that the right of access 
supports the crucial value that “the First Amendment . . . guarantees not 
only free speech, but public access to the information that makes speech 
meaningful.”73  
Justice Brennan, concurring with the majority in Richmond, 
acknowledged the theoretically endless nature of the access right being 
proposed. “Virtually any action could be justified by the need to gather 
information, and virtually any restriction could be challenged as resulting 
in ‘decreased data flow.’” 74  To level this slippery slope, Brennan 
established a two-prong experience and logic test that weighs the access 
right against countervailing interests.75 
The first prong of the test requires that the access claim be 
supported by historical practice.76 Claims are weightier when there is an 
“enduring and vital tradition of public entrée to particular proceedings or 
information,” because “a tradition of accessibility implies the favorable 
judgment of experience.”77 Under the second prong, the value of access 
sought must be “measured in specifics.”78 Access should not be deemed 
unequivocally valuable in its own right, but should be assessed in terms 
of the value of access to the particular process at hand.79  
                                                      
68 Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). 
69  See generally, Raleigh Hannah Levine, Toward a New Public Access 
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In Richmond, the Court related the public right of access to the 
right to listen, or to receive information and ideas.80 The Court held that 
the First Amendment “prohibit[s] government from limiting the stock of 
information from which members of the public may draw.” 81  The 
Supreme Court and scholars have also since acknowledged that the right 
to hear or receive information is crucial for the effective operation of the 
First Amendment. 82  “The marketplace of ideas collapses without 
listeners since the whole purpose of the marketplace is to make a variety 
of ideas, information, opinions, and arguments available to listeners for 
their consideration.”83 In sum, speech has little value if there are no 
listeners to hear or receive it.  
The right to listen was squarely established, again by Justice 
Brennan in a concurring opinion, in Lamont v. Postmaster General.84 In 
striking down a statute that required the Post Office to hold foreign 
communist propaganda until the addressee requested that the mail be 
sent, Brennan pronounced that, “[i]t would be a barren marketplace of 
ideas that had only sellers and no buyers.” 85  Brennan specifically 
conceded that “[i]t is true that the First Amendment contains no specific 
guarantee of access to publications,” but emphasized that the Bill of 
Rights also protects “those equally fundamental personal rights necessary 
to make the express guarantees fully meaningful.”86 
The right to hear and receive information has been heralded by 
the Supreme Court as key to both a commercial marketplace87 and a 
participatory democracy,88 and by scholars as crucial to supporting the 
very core of individual autonomy.89 
Both the right of access and the right to listen are also supported 
by the robust concerns of “knowledge and information policy” that 
                                                      
80 Id. at 576. 
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encapsulate the broader First Amendment values. 90  These policies 
overlap with free speech, but their scope is much broader – seeking, for 
example, to actively promote scientific research, education, and universal 
access to telecommunications facilities.91 Jack Balkin, Director of the 
Information Society Program at Yale Law School, defines the goals of 
knowledge and information policy as, among others, promoting the 
production and diffusion of valuable information and knowledge, 
developing a healthy and vibrant public sphere of opinion and culture, 
and encouraging widespread participation in a culture of information and 
knowledge production. 92  In light of these objectives, the policies 
Congress adopts to regulate the flow of information should aim to 
promote and encourage the fulfillment of these goals. 
C. Application of Access Rights to Orphan Works 
For the reasons evinced by the Court in both Lamont and 
Richmond, it is crucial that Congress recognize the public’s right of 
access to the information found within orphan works.  First, the 
“tradition of openness” and the need to promote accurate fact-finding 
weigh in favor of a public access right to such information. The very 
same virtues inherent to judicial documents that make accurate fact-
finding so important – namely their role in creating an “uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open” debate on public issues, and in ensuring that that 
debate be informed – are present in many of the historical documents 
trapped within the bounds of the orphan works dilemma.93  
Perhaps second only in importance to the contemporary public 
issues that court documents allow us to critique are the deeply important 
historical controversies that our country has weathered. Thomas 
Jefferson is quoted as saying “a morsel of genuine history is a thing so 
rare as to be always valuable.”94 And indeed, true morsels of history are 
becoming even rarer, as primary sources are turning to dust, untouched 
and unpreserved, in our libraries. In testimony before the House, 
representatives for the U.S. Holocaust Museum spoke of the millions of 
pages of archival documents, photographs, oral histories, and reels of 
film that it and other museums cannot publish or digitize.95 In testimony 
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before the Senate, a filmmaker spoke of the historically significant 
images that are removed from documentaries and never reach the public 
because ownership cannot be determined.96 The inability of institutions 
to preserve these items, much less present them to the public, in turn 
limits the ability of the public to engage in a fully informed, culturally 
rich discussion of the vitally important issues embedded within.  
Despite the fact that some works may be of greater or lesser 
political significance, all are still physical manifestations of our country’s 
changing culture and philosophies, and often represent the last vestiges 
of an era. Recently, the National Jazz Museum in Harlem acquired a vast 
collection of previously unreleased recordings from the 1930’s, a rare 
capture of many of jazz’s greats playing improvised pieces. 97  This 
collection represents one of the only documentations of such 
performances, as technology at the time was hardly capable of the 
recording necessary to document long, and often impromptu, jam 
sessions. 98  The director of the Institute of Jazz Studies at Rutgers 
University heralded the collection as “a cultural treasure [that] should be 
made widely available.” 99  Yet the orphan works problem prohibits 
exactly this. Facing a near-impossible search for the recordings’ 
copyright owners, the Museum will be barred from digitizing, 
distributing, or sampling from such works.100 As a consequence, this 
remarkable historic collection will undoubtedly collect dust in the 
basement of the Museum, to the collective detriment of all. 
To give the public’s right of access further weight, any perceived 
right should be subjected to Justice Brennan’s two-part test. The first 
prong of the test asks whether there is a historical practice of granting 
access to the information at issue.101 The answer to this question for 
orphan works could not be a more resounding “yes.” Though Congress 
has not had the opportunity to speak to the public’s right of access to 
orphan works in particular, copyright law has always recognized a robust 
public right of access to copyrighted works in general.102 Public access to 
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copyrighted works has always been lauded as a crucial step in promoting 
the progress of science and the useful arts, the expressed purpose of 
copyright law itself. 103 
In fact, orphan works pass this prong of Justice Brennan’s test in 
even more convincing fashion than judicial documents, which inherently 
retain countervailing interests of privacy and, occasionally, national 
security.104 As opposed to judicial documents, the very fact that orphan 
works are published is a clear sign that the author intended for the work 
to be available to the public. 
The second prong of the Brennan test asks whether the access 
sought specifically enhances the functioning of the government process 
at issue. 105  Of course, this begs the question of what exactly the 
“government process” is for purposes of the discussion. For a better 
understanding, perhaps a more helpful term of art would be the 
“government objective” at work. Here, we can assume the government’s 
overarching objective in keeping orphan works under strict copyright is 
to keep the copyright system functioning effectively. Thus, the question 
becomes whether public access to orphan works enhances the 
functioning of the copyright system. Again, the answer here has to be 
“yes.” Access to orphan works can only serve to improve the copyright 
regime. Providing access allows second-comers to gain knowledge, 
inspiration, and useful material to create their own works, which is 
precisely the model Congress intended when designing copyright policy. 
Furthermore, access to orphan works in particular is aligned with 
the economic incentives that guide copyright policy. The orphan works 
problem often stems from the fact that there is no longer any profit 
potential in the work, so the copyright owner neglects the work, letting it 
fall out of print and off the records.106 Since the market created by the 
copyright monopoly has been exhausted, it is unlikely that allowing 
access to those works will affect authors’ willingness to create in the first 
place.107 A better solution would be “to give the monopoly only for as 
long as necessary to provide an incentive. After that, we should let the 
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work fall into the public domain where all of us can use it, transform it, 
adapt it, build on it, republish it as we wish.”108 
Fundamentally, the right of access to orphan works is squarely 
supported by Justice Brennan’s remarks on the right to listen in Lamont, 
and by knowledge and information policy more generally. Indeed, the 
tragedy here is that the “marketplace of ideas” inherent in the vast 
quantity of orphan works suffers not from a simple lack of buyers, but 
from a large group of potential buyers who are waiting, stymied, at the 
locked entrance. Knowledge and information policy urges us to unlock 
that entrance, to make the First Amendment meaningful, to promote the 
progress of science and the useful arts, and to encourage a robust and 
vibrant public sphere of opinion and culture.  
D. A Proposed Solution 
It is time for Congress to enact legislation addressing orphan 
works, something it has been urged to do by both copyright scholars and 
the Copyright Office.109 This legislation must be carefully tailored to 
recognize the vital right of access without unduly upsetting the inherent 
structure of copyright. This note proposes two changes to the control of 
orphan works: first, an automatic right to preservation, and second, a 
copyright “last will and testament” – an advanced directive that spells 
out a copyright owner’s wishes should his work qualify as an orphan 
work in the future.  
Before either of these remedies can be applied, Congress should 
codify a new definition of orphan works. Scholars have proposed that if 
the author cannot be located after a sufficient period of time, an 
affirmative defense of “abandonment” should be available to the second-
comer.110 The proposed definition would codify this term, not as an 
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affirmative defense, but as a prerequisite for deeming the work 
“orphaned.” Once a work is declared orphaned, it would remain so until 
the work entered the public domain. This way, no litigious parent could 
come racing back in the future to capitalize upon some previously 
unrealized commercial opportunity. In addition to codifying a clear and 
concrete definition of orphan works, presenting this requirement would 
also create an incentive for copyright owners to keep their records in 
line, further mitigating the problem of orphan works.  
Once a work is found to qualify as an orphan, the new legislation 
should allow anyone in possession of it – most often libraries, museums 
and archives – to preserve it in digital format. This right reflects the 
urgency of the problem of orphan works’ disappearance, and the reality 
that digital preservation is easier, cheaper, and more effective than any 
manual restoration efforts.111 Moreover, it respects the public’s right of 
access by ensuring that the work will remain available – and 
comprehensible – for generations to come. Allowing anyone in 
possession to digitize maximizes the probability that the work can be 
found by a second-comer – with many institutions offering the works in 
digital format, public access will be expanded to the benefit of all. 
The right of preservation functions primarily as a mechanism to 
ensure pure access to works. To further use the preserved work in a 
creative way, however, is another hurdle. This note proposes legislation 
that would allow the copyright holder to prescribe the ways that he 
would want his work used in the event that it becomes an orphan. The 
copyright holder would have some discretion in how his work would be 
treated should it become an orphan; however, the owner would not be 
able to opt-out of the preservation efforts unless he could demonstrate 
that he has assigned digitizing rights to a third party. The holder would 
have options, however, in deciding which permissive uses are 
automatically allowed if the copyright owner cannot be contacted. For 
example, a copyright owner may specify that all noncommercial uses of 
his work are permitted should the work become an orphan. Alternatively, 
the owner may favor an even more lenient approach and allow all uses 
that would otherwise require permission, as long as attribution is given to 
the author. Finally, the owner could allow all uses, including derivatives, 
as long as a portion of any revenue generated is donated to the author’s 
charity of choice. 
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Given that 85% of authors would probably not renew copyright 
if renewal were still a prerequisite,112 there is a significant likelihood that 
authors will be willing to relinquish the death grip that copyright policy 
has given them over their works. Particularly in today’s atmosphere of 
open sharing and the widely held desire that information spread to the 
masses, authors may be willing to have their works used and promoted, 
even if they might not receive a possible economic benefit.113 
This legislation, like the definition of orphan works itself, also 
provides a further incentive for authors to remain active in maintaining 
their records. If the copyright holder can be located and contacted, the 
advanced directive never goes into effect, and the holder maintains 
control as usual. If, however the author is lax about maintaining records, 
or circumstances are altered in such a way that the rights cannot be 
traced, then after the requisite period of time of searching, the advanced 
directive kicks in. This system still gives the copyright holder control 
over his work, but balances such control against the overriding public 
need for access. 
CONCLUSION 
No matter how one looks at it, it is clear that the policy 
surrounding orphan works needs to change. From an efficiency 
standpoint, the orphan works dilemma has stifled the smooth interchange 
of ideas and material that could be better used to enhance the creative 
wealth of society. From a cultural standpoint, copyright policy has 
tragically allowed vast amounts of literature, film, and art to be buried by 
time, and, eventually, to slowly disappear. Perhaps most worrisome of 
all, from the viewpoint of knowledge and information policy, the orphan 
works dilemma has created such a barrier to the flow of information as to 
render the First Amendment impotent. In the interest of expanding 
knowledge and maximizing our cultural potential, as well as honoring 
the rights to receive information that we hold so dearly, immediate action 
must be taken to remedy the injustices that copyright policy has 
produced. Orphan works legislation is the only feasible way to achieve 
this, and it is something that must be accomplished before our nation’s 
history and the very growth of knowledge is compromised. 
                                                      
112 See Barbara Ringer, “Study Number 31: Renewal of Copyright,” reprinted in 
U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks 
and Copyrights, Copyright Law Revision, 86th Cong. 1st Sess., Committee Print 
(1960), 187. 
113 See BOYLE, supra note 109, at 13 (defining the Internet as an “existence 
proof” of users’ willingness to share information and services). 
